The normative and the evaluative : the buck-passing account of value

Cover; The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value; Copyright; Contents; Acknowledgements; 1: Introduction; 1.1. Normative reasons for pro-attitudes; 1.2. The buck-passing account of value; 1.3. Motivations for the buck-passing account; 1.4. Overview of the book; 1.5. Clarifying the buck-passing account; 1.5.1. Distinctions in value; 1.5.2. BPA: metaphysical or conceptual?; PART I: Motivation; 2: The Value-First Account and First-Order Neutrality; 2.1. The requirement of neutrality; 2.2. Value-of-the-object-first and deontology; 2.2.1. A certain kind of deontology 2.2.2. Normative/moral linking principles2.2.3. Value-of-the-Object-First is inconsistent with Deontology; 2.3. Other value-first accounts and first-order neutrality; 2.3.1. Value-of-the-Attitude-First; 2.3.2. Agent-Relative-Value-First; 2.3.3. Value-or-Morality First; 3: The Value-First Account and the Unity of the Normative; 3.1. The case for the unity of the normative; 3.2. The value-first account and the unity of the normative; 3.3. Against the value-first account of reasons for belief; 3.3.1. Value-Based views in normative epistemology 3.3.2. The value of believing in line with one's evidence3.3.3. Instrumentalism about epistemic reasons; 3.4. Objections to the unity of the normative; 4: The Buck-Passing Account and The No-Priority View; 4.1. Explaining the correlation between reasons and value; 4.2. Explaining the fact that value never provides non-derivative reasons; 4.3. Grounding reasons in value; 4.4. Qualitative parsimony; 4.5. Explaining similarities between theoretical debates about reasons and about value; 4.6. The case against the no-priority view; 5: Reasons as The Unity among the Varieties of Goodness 5.1. The need for an explanation of the unity among the varieties of goodness5.2. A buck-passing account of good for; 5.3. Objections to the buck-passing account of good for; 5.4. A buck-passing account of goodness of a kind; 5.5. Objections to the buck-passing account of goodness of a kind; 5.6. The case for the buck-passing account of value; PART II: Defence; 6: Too Much Value?; 6.1. The wrong kind of reason problem; 6.2. Having a pro-attitude towards x for x's own sake; 6.3. The demon's threat and normative and motivating reasons; 6.4. The generality of reasons to desire and admire 6.5. Explaining the error6.6. If the wrong kind of reason problem cannot be dissolved, it can be solved; 7: Too Little Value?; 7.1. The trans-world reasons response; 7.2. Reisner on the trans-world reasons response; 7.3. The counterfactual response; 7.4. Reisner on the counterfactual response; 7.4.1. Against the conditionality of reasons; 7.4.2. Reasons and guidingness; 7.5. Bykvist's too much variation in value objection; 8: Not Sufficiently Neutral?; 8.1. Deontology and the consequentialist/deontological distinction; 8.2. Consequentialism about reasons for pro-attitudes